Incentive Based Load Shedding Management in a Microgrid Using

Combinatorial Auction with IoT Infrastructure by Zaidi, Bizzat Hussain et al.
Article
Incentive Based Load Shedding Management in a
Microgrid Using Combinatorial Auction with IoT
Infrastructure
Bizzat. H.Zaidi1, Ihsan Ullah2, Musharraf Alam3, Bamidele Adebisi4, R. Muhammad Atif Azad5,
Ali R. Ansari6 and Raheel Nawaz7*
1 Department of Electrical Engineering, DHA Suffa University, Karachi, Pakistan.
2 Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, CUI, Abbottabad Campus, Abbottabad, Pakistan.
3 Department of Electronics Engineering, Dawood University of Engineering and technology, Karachi,
Pakistan.
4 Department of Engineering, Manchester Metropolitan University, Manchester, UK.
5 School of Computing and Digital Technology, Birmingham City University, Birmingham, UK.
6 Department of Mathematics and Natural Sciences, Gulf University of Science and Technology, Mishref
Campus, Mubarak Al-Abdullah Al-Jaber Block 5, Masjid Al-Aqsa Road, Building 2, Kuwait.
7 Department of Computing and Mathematics, Manchester Metropolitan University, Manchester, UK.
* Correspondence: r.nawaz@mmu.ac.uk
Version March 1, 2021 Journal Not Specified
Abstract: This paper presents a novel incentive-based load shedding management scheme within a1
microgrid environment equipped with the required IoT infrastructure. The proposed mechanism2
works on the principles of reverse combinatorial auction. We consider a region of multiple consumers3
who are willing to curtail their load in the peak hours in order to gain some incentives later. Using4
the properties of combinatorial auctions, the participants can bid in packages or combinations in5
order to maximize their and overall social welfare of the system. The winner determination problem6
of the proposed combinatorial auction, determined using particle swarm optimization algorithm and7
hybrid genetic algorithm, is also presented in this paper. The performance evaluation and stability8
test of the proposed scheme are simulated using MATLAB and presented in this paper. The results9
indicate that combinatorial auctions are an excellent choice for load shedding management where a10
maximum of 50 users participate.11
Keywords: Combinatorial Auction ; Energy Efficiency ; Evolutionary Algorithms ; Load Shedding ;12
Microgrid ; Smart Grid; IoT13
1. Introduction14
With the ever increasing population and growing industrial sector in the developing countries,15
providing a reliable energy service can be very difficult. With a wide gap in the supply capacity16
and the demand on the grid, a lot of investment is needed to improve the gird’s capacity to fulfil17
the demand of its users [1]. To solve this issue, a lot of efforts are now being made to replace the18
macrogrids with microgrids [2]. However, the major source of electricity generation for microgrids19
has been the renewable energy system, which often, is unable to fulfil the grid’s electrical demand.20
In such a scenario, a microgrid can have two possible solutions, a) it can trade electricity from the21
other microgrids or the main grid or b) it can curtail the energy released to its users to match supply22
capacity [2,3]. In this paper, we address the issue of load (or energy) curtailment or load shedding in a23
microgrid setting.24
Previously, some work has been done to manage load shedding. For a fair load shedding smart25
meters can be used to learn the patterns of energy consumption in households [1]. Additionally, the26
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demand response of the households for load shedding can be modelled using two major approaches:27
a) incentive based and b) price based. Incentive based models are considered better in performance [3];28
in such models the users curtail their loads for a pre-determined tariff [3]. Incentive based models have29
been proposed previously. Lee et al gave an idea of using load curtailment as virtual generation, where30
a demand response service provider bade with the generators while giving load reduction instead of31
actual generation as the product [4]. Chai et al used the principle of giving incentives to the customers32
in order to shift their load from the peak prices and in turn maximize the profit of the retailer [4].33
However, the aforementioned work leaves significant scope for improvement. For example, no34
platform exists that selects the customers if several of them are willing to curtail load at the same time.35
This can allow to maximize the payment of load curtailment paid to different users as well as the36
profit for the grid operator. Moreover, all the previous works offer fixed incentives to all the customers37
instead of offering the incentives on merit. Furthermore, most of the works did not consider that a user38
can behave dynamically at different time periods, that is, the user’s willingness to curtail the load or39
afford a different price can change from time to time. In this paper, we propose an auction mechanism40
whereby the users can bid for energy curtailment. Therefore, below, we describe the precedent of using41
auction mechanisms in different scenarios in the power sector.42
Since the arrival of smart grid and the concept of smart cities, a lot has changed on the technology43
front [5–8]. A lot of work has been carried out for the architecture of IoT for smart grids to collect the44
information, thus enabling a lot of different fields [9]. In [10,11], a three-layer structure containing45
device layer, application layer and network layer is discussed. Device layer (or the perception layer )46
utilizes several kinds of different sensor tags and readers or sensor equipment to collect information.47
In [12], four layers are proposed: application layer, device layer, cloud management layer, and network48
layer. The device layer is further divided into two sub-layers: the first one being the thing layer to49
sense environment, control home appliances, and collect data and the second one being the gateway50
layer which controls how to establish a connection to the elements of thing layer. These advancements51
have helped in collecting and processing data from smart and micro grids for applications of energy52
trading and load management.53
IoT devices have been introduced in homes and buildings in recent years in order to collect54
data on the building and its surroundings. These IoT devices can be used to collect several types55
of information and can be deployed on the installations (air handling unit (AHU), lift, chiller, etc.)56
to extract data such as temperature and vibration [13,14]. For the microgrid infrastructure, many57
communication protocols can be adopted. However, by applying different private protocols will result58
in poor interoperability and higher development costs. An alternative is the Internet of Things (IoT),59
an infrastructure of interconnected devices and systems, together with information resources and60
intelligent services. By using IoT to interconnect the devices within the microgrid, the system will61
become more intelligent and efficient. Moreover, the microgrid and energy management systems of62
the customers would no longer be stand-alone entities but part of a ubiquitous network.63
Recently, a lot of efforts have been made on energy trading and its various applications. Energy64
trading has previously been done successfully for energy storage sharing and load sharing [15,16].65
Trading methods for energy can be classified into two different categories, that is, the auction based66
approach and the game theoretic approach [16]. Auction mechanism is seen as a corner stone of the67
energy trading applications [7]. In this study, we have used auction mechanism as a platform to select68
participants in the load curtailment activity in order for them to gain some incentives in return. The69
main purpose of an energy auction is to find the lowest cost relation between demand and supply, and70
increase the overall social welfare, that is, the percentage sum of consumers’ surplus and producers’71
surplus [17]. Competition in an energy auction motivates the users to go for energy saving devices and72
techniques such as demand response. However, most of the deployed auctions ignore the fact the at73
times bidders want to bid in compound ways, that is, they want to submit and win multiple bids at a74
time, in order to maximize their revenues. This problem is known as the exposure problem. A problem75
is defined as an exposure problem, when the will of the user is to win multiple unit of an item or wants76
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to win several different items but end up winning too few [18]. According to different economist,77
exposure problem should be avoided in order to increase the efficiency of the auction process and78
increase the total revenue [18].79
A Combinatorial auctions (CA) are touted as the best possible solution for the exposure problem.80
Using the properties of combinatorial auctions, bidders can place bids on individual items as well as81
combination of items present in the auction in form of packages [19]. The feature of package bidding82
helps combinatorial auctions in solving the exposure problem [20–22].83
Despite their extensive use to solve the exposure problem, the combinatorial auctions have only84
sparingly been used in the field of energy trading that also faces the exposure problem. Penna et al85
introduced the combinatorial auctions in electricity market and used them for seasonal electricity tariff86
[23]. Zaidi et al used combinatorial auctions for multiple microgrid trading [2]. These auctions have87
also been used for allocation of common energy storage sharing and shared facility control application88
[5,15,16,23]. In this research, a reverse combinatorial auction has been used. An auction is said to89
be a reverse auction when it has multiple sellers and one buyer only. In our case, we have multiple90
sellers (the users willing to curtail electricity) and a single buyer (microgird). Each seller sells its91
load reduction for a price incentive. Using reverse combinatorial auction, the users can express their92
willingness in complex combinations in order to maximize their profits.93
The winner determination problem of these auctions is defined to be as NP-Hard [2]. Historically,94
combinatorial auctions have been successfully been solved using Evalutionary algorithms (EA). EA’s95
ability to simultaneously exploit a number of solutions in a search space makes it a promising solution96
for solving various dynamic problems.97
In this study, we use a hybrid algorithm that combines a genetic algorithm (GA) with Binary98
Particle Swarm Optimization (BPSO) to solve the winner determination problems (WDP) for the99
proposed reverse combinatorial auction. The Darwin’s theory of evolution is the main inspiration100
for Genetic Algorithms [24], which in turn define a class of evolutionary algorithms [17,25,26]. These101
Genetic Algorithms use techniques inspired by evolutionary biology such as mutation, inheritance,102
crossover and selection. Using social behaviour model-closely related to the swarming theory- of103
insects, fishes and birds as the main inspiration, Kennedy et al proposed Partical Swarm Optimization,104
more commonly known as PSO [27,28]. Authors of [28], while comparing GA and PSO, concluded that105
the computational cost of both the algorithms is mainly problem dependent. [29] gave a comparison of106
GA and PSO for solving unconstrained and constrained non-linear problems. The authors concluded107
that PSO works better in former problem type whereas, GA outperform PSO when exposed to the later108
problem types, However, studies have showed that despite some strengths and shortcomings or of109
both of the algorithms, hybridization yields better results for many problems in comparison to the110
standalone GA or PSO [27,28,30]; hybridization of metaheuristics is indeed common across a variety111
of evolutionary algorithms [31].112
Both these methods have been extensively used for solving combinatorial auctions’ WDP. A113
Genetic algorithm based determination problem (WDP) is introduced in [32]. The bidders are only114
allowed to generate bid and offers in the XOR bid format because the use of OR and AND bid formats115
entails extra complexities and increases computational time. The PSO method is used in [33] for116
solving the WDP, but this produced suboptimal results. WDP in CA is similar to 0-1 knapsack problem117
and can be optimized using the algorithms used for solving Multi-dimensional Knapsack Problem118
[34]. In the past, hybrid meta heuristics have heavily been used to solve knapsack problem, in order to119
achieve optimality at a quicker rate [33–35].120
The key contributions of this paper are:121
• Idea of setting up a separate market for load curtailment within a microgrid environment with122
suitable IoT infrastructure.123
• The idea of giving different incentives to various different users according to their bids for energy124
curtailment rather than fixed incentives for all.125
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Figure 1. The System Model for proposed mechanism
• An auction mechanism for users to compete for load curtailment in a microgrid based on126
combinatorial auctions127
• A winner determination solution for single sided reverse combinatorial auction for energy128
trading applications (one buyer multiple sellers).129
This work is an extension of [2] where Zaidi et al introduced combinatorial auction based multiple130
microgrid trading mechanism to enable trading in between microgrids, having IoT infrastructure.131
However, this paper focuses on how microgrids can manage their electricity need during peak hours,132
if they are not able to buy any electricity from other microgrids.133
The paper organization is as follows: System model is presented in Section 2; Section 3 presents134
the overall auction process along with the winner determination process; a detailed simulation study135
is explained in Section 4; and finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.136
2. System Model137
Consider a microgrid consisting of n number of consumers such that i = 1, 2, 3..., n. Each consumer138
is supposedly equipped with a load forecast system and energy storage system. Moreover, each day139
is divided into m time intervals such that j = 1, 2, 3..., m. Each consumer Ci expects to consume Coij140
amount of energy at time interval j; however, at the same time it expects to reserve Dij amount of141
energy for energy curtailment, that is, it should be ready to curtail Dij energy whenever the grid needs.142
A microgrid manager (MGM) is connected with the consumers and is also equipped with the load and143
generation forecast system. When for time interval j, MGM predicts the shortfall of energy, it requests144
the auctioneer to start the auction for load curtailment. The auctioneer then sends the auction start145
notification to the consumers. MGC has a maximum reservation price Pj.Similarly, each consumer also146
has a minimum desirable incentive they are expecting for load curtailment.147
Figure 1 shows the overall system model. The overall system is divided into three entities; buyer,148
sellers and auctioneer. In the proposed mechanism, MGM is the buyer, consumers are the sellers,149
whereas the auctioneer is a third party, who is responsible for gathering the bids from different entities,150
processing the winning bids and calculating the price of each trade. Provided with the load profile of151
the overall system and at the end based on combinatorial auctions a load curtailment market is set up.152
In this study, the energy management system, the auctioneer, and the microgrid manager are all153
located within the same microgrid and are connected by either a wireless or a wired network. For the154
wireless networks, lightweight IP stacks and the IPv6-based communication protocol can be used to155
enable communication between the energy management systems of the customers and the auctioneer.156
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Figure 2. Overall auction process
For this purpose, 6LoWPAN [36,37] can be applied to low-power devices with limited processing157
capabilities allowing them to participate in the IoT infrastructure.158
3. Overall Auction process159
3.1. Main Entities160
The buyer, sellers and the auctioneer are the three main entities involved the auction process.161
Users acts as sellers as they are selling their capability to sell load curtailment, grid becomes the buyer,162
which buys users ability to curtail load at a certain given incentive. Whereas, auctioneer is the central163
figure which controls this trade between users and the grid. Figure 2 shows the overall auction process.164
At the start of the auction, the auctioneer collects the bids from the grid and users and arranges them165
in accordance to their order design. After bids initialization, winners are selected using the WDP. The166
WDP of the combinatorial auctions improves the overall social welfare. The buyer, sellers and the167
auctioneer are the three main entities involved the auction process. At the start of the auction, the168
auctioneer collects the bids from the buyer and sellers and arranges them in accordance to their order169
design. After bids initialization, winners are selected using the WDP. The WDP of the combinatorial170
auctions improves the overall social welfare.171
3.2. Structure of the Auctioneer172
Figure 3 shows the overall structure of the auctioneer. The key components of auctioneer are as173
follows;174
a. Market Communication Manager: For Communication between auctioneer and bidders. It175
collects the bids, informs the bidders about the results, communicates with the matching module176
via order book and output manager.177
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Figure 3. Structure of the auctioneer
b. New Bid Clock: Keeps an eye on new bids. If the timer runs out, the winners are announced178
and round of auction is concluded. Refreshes to the initial stage, whenever there is a new bid is179
received180
c. New Winner Clock: Keeps a tab on new Winner. Refreshes whenever there is a new winner181
(buyer and sellers selected for trade).182
d. Matching Module: Runs the Winner Determination algorithm and selects the winners. Looks for183
new winners until round of auction has ended. Gets the bids from market logs and announce the184
results through output manager and communication manager.185
e. Order Book: All the bids are collected in the order book and remains there until they win or are186
expired.187
f. Market Output Manager: Gets the results from the matching module and store them in market188
log, while also giving the results to users via market communication manager189
g. Market Log: Keeps the history of the market trades, all the winning and non-winning bids which190
(valid and expired bids) via order book and output manager. Provides historical data to the users191
and the grid.192
3.3. Social Welfare193
The percentage sum of consumers’ surplus and producers’ surplus is said be as the social welfare194
[5]. This can be expressed as195









where, S.W. is the social welfare, Consur is consumer’s surplus, Prosur is the producer’s surplus,196
Conwill ; in EUR; is the price the consumer is willing to pay, Prowill ; in EUR;is the minimum price the197
producer is willing to get, and Willactual in EUR, is the trading price determined by the auctioneer.198
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3.4. Bid Configurations for Submission199
The idea of package bidding or combinations is used in the combinatorial auctions. In package200
bidding, bidders are entitled to submit more than one bid, according to their needs and optimal201
function, at any time [20–22]. In this study, users are permitted to bid in order configuration using OR202
bids, XOR bids and atomic bids [20–22].203
3.5. Winner Determination Process204
Integer programming can be used to express the winner determination problem also termed205
here as utility or fitness function. In this study, solving the winner determination problem means206
maximizing the overall load reduction for the MGM along as well as the increasing the incentives for207




























Hi = Di.ai (7)
TPi,j ≥ RPi,j (8)
where, Hi,j, measured in KW represents all the accepted load reductions, Di is the load reduction210
bade by the individual customer I, whereas ai shows whether the bid is accepted or rejected; ai can211
be either 1 or 0. If any part of the bid is accepted, the value of ai becomes 1. Pj, in EUR is the grid212
(buyer)’s maximum reservation price for all hours of the day, whereas, TPi,j, in EUR, is the incentive213
price allotted to customer i at time j. Sh is the maximum value of curtailment in KW, needed at time j.214
And RPi,j, in EUR is the minimum reservation price of the users (sellers).215
The winner determination problem (WDP) of combinatorial auctions is considered to be NP-Hard216
problem. And it is similar to the 0 − 1 knapsack problem (KP) [38,39]. A KP problem occurs when217
resource allocation must obey different constraints. Initially, single-unit winner determination problem218
was equated to weighted set packing problem [40]. However, authors of [39] discussed a relationship219
between winner determination and knapsack problems [39]. Since, KPs -which are intensively studied220
in the past – are relatively easy to understand; solving CA as 0 − 1 KP has been a common practice ,221
To solve the 0 − 1 KPs, the use of meta-heuristics has been frequent [41].As combinatorial problems222
require larger search space as compared to other optimization problems; thus, Meta-heuristics such223
as EAs have been seen as an ideal solution.. Additionally, EA’s ability to simultaneously exploit a224
number of solutions in a search space makes it a promising solution for solving various dynamic225
problems. It is well known that the research on WDP algorithms has profited from the algorithms226
used for Multi-Dimensional KP [39,40]. Many of previous studies have considered EA for winner227
determination of combinatorial auctions by mapping the WDP as KP [29,32]. However, these works228
have their limitations as well; for example, the time taken to find the optimal solution is large,229
or the optimal solution is not found at all. This is because in combinatorial auctions, each and230
every combination possible is checked similar to the KP; this produces a large search space. Hybrid231
Meta-heuristics are able to find the optimal solution for such problems and effectively solve the WDP232
of combinatorial auctions [2,32]. In this study, we use a hybrid algorithm that combines a genetic233
algorithm (GA) with Binary Particle Swarm Optimization (BPSO) to solve the winner determination234
Version March 1, 2021 Journal Not Specified 8 of 17
Figure 4. Population Type
Figure 5. Bid selection structure in Binary form
problems for the proposed reverse combinatorial auction. In the past, hybrid meta heuristics have235
heavily been used to solve knapsack problem, in order to achieve optimality at a quicker rate [33–35].236
3.6. Proposed Algorithms237
The BPSO algorithm is an iterative method that we leverage to optimise the objective function238
defined in 4 subject to eqs. 5- 7. BPSO starts by randomly generating a swarm of particles, where each239
particle is a binary string as shown in Figures 4 and 5. A signle particle is depicted in Figure 4. Particles240
indicate a suggested solution in terms of accepted and rejected bids, as shown in Figure 5, where bid241
acceptance is represented using 1 and 0 shows a rejected bid. While generating the swarm, OR and242
XOR bids have the most priority, while the atomic bids have the least priority. In BPSO, each particle243
has a position vector and a velocity vector. A particle’s position encodes a candidate solution to the244
problem at hand (a combination of bids in our case). Since the current position (or the solution) is not245
necessarily optimal, the PSO iteratively changes the position of each particle such that the average246
quality of the solutions in the swarm improves. The velocity of each particle represents the magnitude247
and the direction of change in its position in the next iteration.248
Initially, as stated earlier, each particle k is assigned a random position zk and a random velocity249
vk [2]. Each particle’s fitness value (that is the quality of the solution that it represents) is calculated250
using the objective function defined in eq. 4 subject to eqs. 5 – 8; as the fitness values are evaluated for251
each particle, the personal best position found for each particle and the global best position for the252
entire swarm are updated. The personal best position indicates the best fitness value of each particle253
(so far given the changes in its position), whereas the global best position indicates the best fitness254
value amongst all the particles. This process is run until the saturation point is reached. A saturation255
point is defined as the stage after which there is no change in the global or personal best positions. The256
particles with the lower fitness values are discarded and the global best solution along with other fit257
particles are taken to the next step.258
After the above process, a group of particles with the highest fitness values, that is, the elite259
particle group, is further refined via a Genetic Algorithm (GA). Following the GA terminology, each260
particle’s position vector is now called a chromosome. Instead of using velocity vectors to manipulate261
these chromosomes, these chromosomes are now manipulated via the artificial genetic operators, that262
is, mutation and crossover to form new chromosomes [5]. As earlier in the PSO, the fitness of each263
chromosome resulting from the artificial genetic operators is calculated using the winner determination264
objective defined in eq. 4 subject to eqs. 5 – 8. The process is repeated until the saturation point is265
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reached. TThe final successful bid matches are represented by the chromosome with the best fitness266
value. The overall winner determination process is shown by Algorithm 1.267
Algorithm 1: Hybrid GA and BPSO For Combinatorial Auction (AUCGENPSO)







Calculate particle’s position and velocity
Calculate Fitness Function using Eq. 4
Until saturation is reached
# Genetic Algorithm
Select the set of fittest particles from PSO to initialise the GA population
Repeat
Perform reproduction using crossover and mutation
Calculate fitness function using Eq. 4





We assume that 50 households are connected in a microgrid environment. The users are connected271
to the microgrid controller via an auctioneer. The microgrid is equipped with a generation capacity272
of 350 KW to 400 KW. The households bid for the load reduction for incentives at different times of273
the day using combinatorial auction mechanism. Profile of households along with the price data was274
taken from [42,43]. MATLAB R2015a was used to implement the proposed auction mechanism. Using275
a Matlab based bid generator, combinatorial bids were generated for the simulation purpose [44]. The276
simulation results are compared to the sequential double auction [45]. The load profiles, showing277
average and maximum load of the participating users are shown in Table 1.278
Table 1. Load Profiles of Households
Household 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Avg. Load (KW) 2.32 4.26 4.3 3.13 4.76 3.9 4.06 4.17 3.8 3.79 4.03 4.45 5.71 5.54 4.49
Max Load (KW) 3.72 4.57 5.81 4.61 6.25 5.73 5.35 5.2 5.29 4.94 5.182 5.76 6.82 6.21 5.42
Household 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
Avg. Load 2.83 3.78 4.9 4.8 3.9 3.84 5.6 4.03 5.44 4.23 4.38 3.771 3.81 4.74 5.44
Max Load 3.96 4.51 5.67 5.72 4.94 4.81 6.3 4.97 6.31 5.09 5.21 4.67 4.89 5.64 6.23
279
4.2. Simulation Analysis280
The simulations analyses conducted in this study are described next.281
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Figure 6. Average load profile before and after load reduction is presented.
4.2.1. Average Load Profile282
The overall load profile of the micro-grid is compared in two cases; a) without any load reduction283
and b) with load reduction. As illustrated in 6, the red line shows the maximum generation capacity284
of the microgrid, so it is necessary for the load to stay below this line. However, the original load285
profile peaks at around 20 and 42 hours, which in turn requires load shedding. However, after the286
load reduction, these peaks stay under the maximum generation capacity and the load is successfully287
shifted at other times, that is, between 10 and 15 hours and 25 and 40 hours. Moreover, in the load288
profile after load reduction, the overall load stays below the maximum generation time for the entire289
time, thus eliminating the load-shedding scenario at all times.290
4.2.2. Load Reduction291
In this subsection, we compared the load reduction done using combinatorial auctions and292
Sequential Double Auction. As illustrated in 7 , the amount of load reduction increases as the number293
of users increases. Furthermore, the load reduction with respect to the number of users is better for294
combinatorial auctions than for sequential auctions for up to 65 users. However, the load reduction295
through combinatorial auctions got saturated around 75 users, highlighting its limitation for larger296
number of users. Whereas, load reduction through sequential auctions maintained an increasing trend.297
298
4.2.3. Average Incentives299
In this subsection, we compared the average incentives per unit for combinatorial and sequential300
double auctions. As shown in Figure 8, as the number of users are increased, the amount of incentive301
per KWh is decreased because of the increase in number of winners. Moreover, the results of302
combinatorial auctions are better than the sequential auctions. Though, the combinatorial auctions303
saturate around 55 user but have a better results than sequential auction for up to 75 users. This304
concludes that for a region where number of users are less than 75, combinatorial auctions are good305
choice and vice versa.306
4.2.4. Social Welfare307
In this subsection, we have compared the social welfare, explained in equations 1-3, of the auction.308
In Figure 9 the social welfare of combinatorial auctions is compared to the social welfare of the309
sequential double auction. For up to 65 users, at 1.25(25%) the overall social welfare is better for the310
combinatorial auctions than at 1.2(20%) for the sequential double auction case. Figure 9 shows the311
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Figure 7. Overall load reduction.
Figure 8. Average Incentive per KW Reduction.
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Figure 9. (a) Social Welfare Comparison (b) Social Welfare Comparison for Different Bid Types in
Combinatorial Auctions
comparison of social welfare for different bid types used in the combinatorial auctions, that is, OR,312
XOR and the atomic bids. The XOR bids have the highest social welfare value of 1.27 whereas, OR has313
the maximum figure of around 1.22. The atomic bids have a maximum social welfare value of up to 1.2.314
Moreover, it was also noted that the overall social welfare value saturates around 45 to 50 number of315
users for the combinatorial auction. Thus, making the proposed combinatorial auctions a good choice316
for up to 50 users.317
4.2.5. Optimality Analysis of Proposed Algorithm318
Under this heading, we compare our the proposed technique, with BPSO and GA, with the number319
of generations and the fitness value or generally iterations as the main parameter for performance320
evaluation. An optimal solution, having low number of iterations and high fitness value, was the321
desired outcome. While increasing the number of users from 10 to 30, the number of generations322
required to obtain the optimal fitness value were observed. A comparison between the proposed323
algorithm with GA and BPSO is depicted in Figure 10. BPSO, while converging early for up to 30 users324
, has a lower fitness value as compared to GA, which takes the highest time to converge However,325
AUCGENPSO clearly outperforms GA as it converges early with a higher fitness value.326
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Figure 10. Optimality Results (a) No. of Bidders = 10 (b) No. of Bidders = 20 (c) Number of Bidders =
30
5. Conclusion327
Load shedding is a major issue especially with the ever growing power demand. With the328
advancement in IoT technology, it is easier for the grids to ask users to curtail load at the time of329
peak demand. In this paper, we focused on a scenario where in a microgrid environment, the service330
provider hands out incentives to customers to curtail their load during the peak hours. Problem from331
the service provider’s end was discussed in this paper and was solved using auction mechanism to332
select the customers to participate in load curtailment in order to gain some incentives. For better333
efficiency of the system, combinatorial auctions were used. The proposed method was shown to be334
useful in a microgrid environment by performing the performance evaluation of the overall auction335
process. Moreover, it was noted that the social welfare improved as the number of participants336
increased.337
This work can be further extended by adding non-financial incentives along with the financial338
incentives. Furthermore, many different combinations such as AND can also be included in the future339
studies. Finally, other machine learning algorithms [47] can also be explored, compared and contrasted.340
Appendix A. Sequential Auctions341
A scenario where multiple players share a common ES plant was established. Sequential auctions342
is organized at different time intervals t. Supplier submitted its supply bids including the minimum343
price at which it is willing to trade and each player submitted their demand bid, which includes the344
maximum price at which they can trade. Then, by using supply and demand curves, the uniform345
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clearing price and trading volume are identified. Buyers who bid more than the maximum clearing346
price are allowed to buy storage rights [42].347
Appendix B. Genetic Operators348
B.1. Crossover Mechanism349
Crossover is a process to combine two or more solutions (or chromosomes as they are called in the GA350
parlance) to create new solutions [46]. In this study, we have used the uniform crossover mechanism.351
In the uniform crossover mechanism, corresponding genes (bit positions) of two parent chromosomes352
are exchanged to form two new (or offspring) chromosomes. Figure 11 exemplifies the crossover353
mechanism used in this study. In this example, the offspring particles have half the information from354
each of the parent particles arranged in a random manner.
Figure 11. CrossOver Mechanism
355
B.2. Mutation Mechanism356
In mutation, one or more chromosome gene values are altered randomly [46]. Figure 12 shows the357
mutation mechanism used in this study. One chromosome representing bid matches is changed to a358
new one using a bit-flip mutation (0 is flipped to 1). This forms a new set of chromosomes and hence359
increases the variability of the population.
Figure 12. Mutation Mechanism
360
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